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THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RABBIT HOLE: RECONCILING 
RECENT SUPREME COURT PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
JURISPRUDENCE WITH JURISDICTION TO TERMINATE 
PARENTAL RIGHTS 
by 
Joan M. Shaughnessy* 
This Essay contrasts the jurisdictional regime followed in termination of 
parental rights and other child custody cases with the regime that has 
dominated recent Supreme Court personal jurisdiction cases. Jurisdiction 
in child custody cases has long been based upon the connection of the 
child, not the defendant parent, to the jurisdiction. Recent Supreme 
Court cases, on the other hand, have focused nearly exclusively on the de-
fendant’s connection to the forum state. This Essay argues that the Su-
preme Court cases betray a failure of the Court to provide a consistent 
constitutional justification for the jurisdictional limitations it has im-
posed. The Essay suggests that the regime followed in child custody cases 
can be reconciled with the various justifications that the Court has of-
fered for limiting the scope of personal jurisdiction and further suggests 
that the child custody jurisdictional regime provides a useful example of 
a constitutionally permissible jurisdictional regime based upon the inter-
est of the forum state in resolving the dispute and the connection of the 
litigation to the forum state.  
 
“If you’re reading this tribute, chances are that you, too, are a 
jurisdiction junkie at some level. If you’re a Civil Procedure per-
son like me, the attachment to jurisdiction (no pun intended) 
seems obvious and natural. But the same can be said for the 
faithful followers of Family Law, who inhabit their own world of 
jurisdictional madness on the other side of the rabbit hole.”1 
 
 
* Roger D. Groot Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of 
Law. My thanks are owed to John Parry and the Lewis & Clark Law Review for the 
invitation to participate in this symposium. I also owe a debt of gratitude to the 
students in Civil Procedure over the years whose work on the Grey memorandum 
assignment helped me to think through this argument. Finally, so many fine scholars 
have written in this area, I regret that space permits me to acknowledge only a 
handful of the many articles that have advanced scholarship in the field. 
1 Steven S. Gensler, A Tribute to Robert Spector: “It Started With Jurisdiction,” 63 
Okla. L. Rev. v, v (2011). Professor Robert Spector is the Reporter for the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA, discussed below) for the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Id. at vi.  
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 In recent decades the Supreme Court has handed down dozens of 
opinions attempting to define the limitations imposed by the Due Pro-
cess Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution on the exercise of judicial jurisdiction. The Court’s 
jurisprudence has suffered from an inability of the Justices to agree on 
the fundamental rationale for the limitations it has imposed.2 At times, 
the Court has invoked federalism as a rationale, seeing the limitations on 
jurisdiction as a function of the limitations on the sovereign power of the 
states.3 The Court has also sometimes suggested that its limitations are, in 
part, based upon concerns about international comity and rapport.4 In 
other opinions, the Court has rejected the sovereignty rationale in favor 
of a focus on the fairness of forcing an unwilling litigant to defend in an 
inconvenient forum—in effect, offering a procedural due process ra-
tionale for its jurisdictional limitations.5 In recent years, the Supreme 
Court has increasingly insisted that its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence 
is intended to protect defendants by requiring a substantial connection 
between the defendant and the forum state. As Justice Thomas observed 
for a unanimous Court in Walden, 
[T]he relationship must arise out of contacts that the “defendant 
himself” creates with the forum State. Due process limits on the 
State’s adjudicative authority principally protect the liberty of the 
nonresident defendant—not the convenience of plaintiffs or 
third parties. We have consistently rejected attempts to satisfy the 
defendant-focused “minimum contacts” inquiry by demonstrating 
contacts between the plaintiff (or third parties) and the forum 
state.6 
The plurality in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro7 was even more 
explicit about the defendant-protective nature of the Court’s recent ju-
risprudence.8 In the plurality opinion in that case, Justice Kennedy 
opined that “[t]he Due Process Clause protects an individual’s right to be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property only by the exercise of lawful pow-
er.”9 In what might be characterized as a substantive due process ra-
tionale, the plurality opinion went on to assert that lawful power required 
 
2 See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: 
From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 19 (1990). 
3 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980); 
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1958).  
4 See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762–63 (2014). 
5 See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–74 (1985). 
6 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014) (citations omitted). Justice 
Thomas is not completely correct here, he overlooks the Court’s decision in Mullane 
v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See discussion infra note 46. 
7 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
8 Id. at 2785. For a critical analysis of Nicastro, see John T. Parry, Due Process, 
Borders, and the Qualities of Sovereignty—Some Thoughts on J. McIntrye Machinery v. 
Nicastro, 16 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 827 (2012). 
9 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786. 
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that the defendant “submit to” a state’s authority.10 In Justice Kennedy’s 
words,“[t]he question is whether a defendant has followed a course of 
conduct directed at the society or economy existing within the jurisdic-
tion of a given sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to subject 
the defendant to judgment concerning that conduct.”11 
In its recent jurisprudence, the Court has made no reference to a ju-
risdictional doctrine that has allowed state courts all over the country to 
enter orders affecting defendants who have had no contact with the fo-
rum state. It is accepted practice in family law cases for state courts to en-
ter orders concerning child custody and parental rights based upon the 
presence of the child in the jurisdiction, even when one of the parents 
affected by the order has never “submitted to the state’s authority.”12 This 
accepted practice, which dates back many decades, is now codified in the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA),13 
which has been adopted in forty-nine states.14 This well-established and 
successful legislation provides a model for a different and more coherent 
approach to structuring limitations on state court jurisdiction. 
The main outlines of the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence 
are familiar and need be sketched only briefly. Pennoyer v. Neff was the 
first Supreme Court case to tie limitations on state court exercises of per-
sonal jurisdiction to the then-new Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.15 Interestingly, the Court did not derive the jurisdictional 
limitations from the text or history of the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Instead, the Pennoyer Court found the limitations in what it 
described as “well-established principles of public law,” which it derived 
primarily from international law treatises.16 Those principles, the Pennoyer 
Court held, prevented a state court from exercising direct jurisdiction 
over persons and property outside the state, but did permit a state to in-
directly affect out-of-state persons and property through its exercise of 
jurisdiction over in-state persons or property.17 The Court went on to ob-
serve that the newly enacted Due Process Clause provided a mechanism 
for litigants to directly challenge and resist the enforcement of judg-
 
10 Id. at 2787–89. 
11 Id. at 2789. 
12 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 79 (1971). 
13 Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 9(1A) U.L.A. 649 
(1997) [hereinafter UCCJEA]. 
14 See The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Acts: 
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Uniform Law Commission (2015), 
http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Child+Custody+Jurisdiction+and+ 
Enforcement+Act for information concerning the adoption of the UCCJEA, 
including an Enactment Status Map showing forty-nine states, plus the Virgin Islands 
and the District of Columbia, have adopted the UCCJEA, and noting that a bill to do 
so has been introduced in the Massachusetts legislature this year. 
15 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878). 
16 Id. at 722–23. 
17 Id.  
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ments entered in violation of the principles of public law laid out earlier 
in the opinion.18 
The reasoning of Pennoyer has created problems ever since. Because 
it grounded the limitations it imposed on state court jurisdiction not in 
the text or purpose of the Due Process Clause, but rather in a distinct 
body of public law, the Pennoyer Court paved the way for the doctrinal in-
stability that persists to this day. The Court in Pennoyer did not discuss at 
great length the rationale for the principles it identified but the rationale 
it did offer was clearly grounded in concerns about infringements on 
state sovereignty by sister states.19 Those concerns are not generally un-
derstood to be the concerns underlying the Due Process Clause.20 
The Pennoyer Court also seemed to recognize that its focus on juris-
diction based upon in-state presence or property was inadequate even 
then to account for the jurisdictional landscape. Accordingly, the opin-
ion concluded with a number of caveats, suggesting, for example, that a 
state could condition certain in-state activities by non-residents on con-
sent to jurisdiction.21 Most significantly for our purposes, the Pennoyer 
Court specifically addressed the power of a state court to enter judgment 
determining the status of a non-resident at the behest of a resident plain-
tiff. “The jurisdiction which every State possesses to determine the civil 
status and capacities of all its inhabitants involves authority to prescribe 
the conditions on which proceedings affecting them may be commenced 
and carried on within its territory.”22 
In the years following Pennoyer, the Court struggled to accommodate 
its framework to a rapidly modernizing and expanding nation. Relying in 
part on legal fictions extending the concept of in-state persons and prop-
erty and the concept of consent, it approved the exercise of jurisdiction 
in many cases involving interstate transactions and events. In International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Court took the opportunity to harmonize its 
existing precedent, offering a new test for the scope of state courts’ in 
personam jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations.23 The Court, in its 
famous formulation, held that 
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant 
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory 
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice.”24 
 
18 Id. at 733. 
19 Id. at 720. 
20 See Leonard G. Ratner, Procedural Due Process and Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: (a) 
Effective-Litigation Values vs. The Territorial Imperative (b) The Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 363, 364–66 (1980). 
21 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735. 
22 Id. at 734. 
23 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
24 Id. 
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The Court in International Shoe was focused on justifying the expan-
sion of jurisdiction in the decades following Pennoyer. The Court there-
fore concentrated on its justification for permitting the exercise of juris-
diction over out-of-state defendants, and did not offer much explanation 
for its statement later in the opinion that “[the Due Process C]lause does 
not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam 
against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no 
contacts, ties, or relations.”25 
Support can be found in the opinion for various theories, which 
were developed in the decades following International Shoe.26 For example, 
support can be found in the Court’s reference to “the context of our fed-
eral system of government,”27 for the proposition that the limits on juris-
diction are premised on federalism concerns.28 Hanson v. Denkla and 
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson both relied in part on this proposition 
in prohibiting the exercise of jurisdiction even in cases where the de-
fendant could show no inconvenience and the forum state had a strong 
interest in the litigation.29 Later opinions, particularly Insurance Corp. of 
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, reject the federalism argu-
ment.30 As the Court in Compagnie des Bauxites observed, 
The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of 
the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process 
Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction 
requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of federal-
ism concerns.31 
Even setting aside the federalism justification, there remains debate 
within the Court about the justification for the limitations on jurisdiction. 
International Shoe’s reference to “fair play” and later to the “inconven-
iences” of litigating away from home suggests that the justification for ju-
risdictional limits is the same as other procedural due process limits on 
 
25 Id. at 319. 
26 Of course, the theories are not mutually exclusive and some scholars have 
argued that a combination of different rationales explain the Court’s jurisprudence. 
See, e.g., Stephen Goldstein, Federalism and Substantive Due Process: A Comparative and 
Historical Perspective on International Shoe and Its Progeny, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 965 
passim (1995); Parry, supra note 8, at 831–32. 
27 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317. 
28 See generally Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of “State Sovereignty” and the 
Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
699 (1983). For an argument that personal jurisdiction limitations should be 
conceptualized as “a manifestation of horizontal federalism,” see Allan Erbsen, 
Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 Emory L.J. 1, 7 (2010). 
29 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980); Hanson 
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958). 
30 Ins. Corp. of Ir., v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982). 
31 Id. at 702 n.10. 
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procedures which unfairly burden litigants.32 Something of this view is re-
flected in Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court in Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz33 and in his dissent in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson and 
Rush v. Shavchuk.34 Pre-suit contacts with the forum can be understood, 
on this reading, as serving a notice function by allowing the defendant to 
plan in advance for the possibility of litigation in the forum.35 The proce-
dural due process justification also informed the Court’s opinion in Asahi 
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, which relied on a multi-factor test to 
reject California’s attempt to exercise jurisdiction over a claim for in-
demnification by a Taiwanese corporation against a Japanese corpora-
tion.36 
Another understanding of limitations the Court has imposed on the 
exercise of jurisdiction is grounded, not in procedural due process, but 
rather in substantive due process.37 That argument might be traced back 
to International Shoe’s reference approving the exercise of jurisdiction 
over defendants who had the “benefits and protection” of the forum 
state,38 which in turn may give rise to the obligation to defend in that fo-
rum.39 There are echoes of that formulation in Walden,40 but even more 
emphatically in the Nicastro plurality, with its emphasis on the need to 
show that the defendant had voluntarily submitted to the power of the 
sovereign.41 
The Court’s failure to provide a full justification for its jurisdictional 
jurisprudence leads to disagreement among the Justices and to uncer-
tainty for litigants and lower courts.42 It also has permitted the Court to 
avoid the necessity of explaining how its jurisdictional decisions fit within 
the larger landscape of procedural and substantive due process law. If 
limitations on jurisdiction are a matter of procedural due process, then 
arguably the Mathews v. Eldridge test,43 with its cost-benefit balancing anal-
ysis, should be taken into account in assessing the permissibility of asser-
 
32 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–17. 
33 Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–74 (1985). 
34 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299–300. Justice Brennan wrote a single 
dissent from both World-Wide and Rush. 
35 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
36 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113–16 (1987). 
37 A number of scholars have characterized the Court’s limits on jurisdiction as 
grounded in substantive due process. For a recent example, see Charles W. “Rocky” 
Rhodes, Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and Personal Jurisdiction, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 567, 
572 (2007). For an entertaining earlier discussion, see Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, 
Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 
Wash. L. Rev. 479 (1987). 
38 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
39 See Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L. 
Rev. 529, 539–40 (1991) for a discussion of this line of argument.  
40 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014). 
41 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2787–88 (2011). 
42 See Erbsen, supra note 28, at 3. 
43 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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tions of jurisdiction.44 Similarly, if the limitations are a matter of substan-
tive due process, the elaborate structure the Court has constructed, re-
quiring different levels of justification for state intrusions into different 
protected interests, should be relevant.45 Either way, the Court’s larger 
due process jurisprudence suggests that the liberty interest of the de-
fendant being protected by cases like Walden and Daimler is not absolute 
but is subject to defeasance under certain circumstances. Nevertheless, in 
most of the Court’s personal jurisdiction due process cases going back to 
Hanson and including Walden and Daimler, it is hard to find any acknowl-
edgment that the need for defendant’s “own affiliation with the state” 
can be overcome for any reason.46 
The jurisdiction regime followed by family courts around the coun-
try, in termination of parental rights cases as well as other custody cases, 
is completely different. The defendant’s affiliation with the state is nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient for jurisdiction.47 Instead, under the 
UCCJEA, jurisdiction in the vast majority of cases is premised on a find-
ing that the forum state is the “home state” of the child.48 If the child 
lacks a home state, jurisdiction will ordinarily be based upon a substantial 
 
44 See Patrick J. Borchers, Jones v. Flowers: An Essay on a Unified Theory of 
Procedural Due Process, 40 Creighton L. Rev. 343 (2007) for an elaboration of how the 
Court’s personal jurisdiction cases could be harmonized with its general procedural 
due process jurisprudence.  
45 Rocky Rhodes discusses at length the various substantive due process tests that 
might be used to determine when a state can overcome a defendant’s liberty interest. 
See Rhodes, supra note 37, passim. Stephen Goldstein argues for a retreat from the 
Court’s “maximalist substantive due process approach” in favor of a “minimalist 
approach” in Goldstein, supra note 26, at 998. 
46 There are a handful of exceptions. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank upheld the 
exercise of jurisdiction over a group of trust beneficiaries, some of whom had no 
connection with the forum state, holding that “the interest of each state in providing 
means to close trusts that exist by the grace of its laws and are administered under the 
supervision of its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish beyond 
doubt the right of its courts to determine the interests of all claimants, resident or 
nonresident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity to appear and be 
heard.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). See also 
Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (upholding state court jurisdiction 
over absent plaintiff class members without minimum contacts, as long as procedural 
due process protections were provided). The Court has also explicitly reserved 
decision on whether the doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity can overcome the need 
for minimum contacts, at least where defendant has property in the forum. See 
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977). Justice Black argued against such a 
requirement in his Hanson dissent, Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258–59 (1958), 
and in his World-Wide/Rush dissent, Justice Brennan urged the abolition of the 
defendant’s “unjustified veto power over certain very appropriate fora.” World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 312 (1980). John Parry places Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent in Nicastro in this category. See Parry, supra note 8, at 849. 
47 UCCJEA, supra note 13, § 201(c) (“Physical presence of, or personal 
jurisdiction over, a party or a child is not necessary or sufficient to make a child-
custody determination.”) 
48 Id. § 201(a)(1).  
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connection of the child and at least one parental figure with the forum.49 
The UCCJEA also contains provisions permitting the action to be moved 
to a state that has been determined to be a more convenient forum,50 and 
provisions for the exercise of temporary emergency jurisdiction where 
necessary to protect children present in the state.51 
Although the UCCJEA is relatively new, having been approved by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1997,52 
it has long been the case that jurisdiction over child custody matters 
turned on the child’s connection to the forum state. The first Restatement 
of Conflicts, published in 1934, took the position that the forum in which a 
child was domiciled had jurisdiction to decide on custody.53 It also pro-
vided that a court had jurisdiction to order removal of a child from an 
unfit custodian, as long as the child was present in the forum state.54 
Over time, state courts began to depart from the traditional rule, re-
flected in the first Restatement, that the forum of the child’s domicile had 
exclusive jurisdiction to determine custody.55 Some states based jurisdic-
tion on the presence of the child in the state, some on the court’s in per-
sonam jurisdiction over the parents, and some recognized the possibility 
that all three bases of jurisdiction might be permissible.56 In an influen-
tial decision authored by Justice Traynor, the California Supreme Court 
took the latter view,57 and the drafters of the second Restatement of Conflicts 
eventually followed the California court’s lead, permitting the exercise of 
jurisdiction based upon in personam jurisdiction over the parties to the 
controversy, but not requiring it when the child was either domiciled or 
present in the state.58 
Over the course of the twentieth century, as Americans became more 
mobile and divorce became more common, the jurisdictional approaches 
used by courts and reflected in the second Restatement of Conflicts came 
under increasing criticism from family law scholars and other interested 
observers.59 Estranged parents were taking their children across state 
 
49 Id. § 201(a)(2) (subsection (a)(2) also requires that substantial evidence 
concerning the child be available in the forum state). 
50 Id. §§ 201(a)(3), 207. 
51 Id. § 204. 
52 Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (Nat’l Conf. of 
Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws) (Proposed Official Draft 1997), http://www. 
uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/child_custody_jurisdiction/uccjea_final_97.pdf. 
53 Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws §§ 145–46 (1934). 
54 Id. § 148. 
55 For a survey of cases, see Sampsell v. Superior Court, 197 P.2d 739, 748–50 (Cal. 
1948) and Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 79 reporter’s note (1971).  
56 Sampsell, 197 P.2d at 748–50. 
57 Id. 
58 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 79 (1971).  
59 See Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A 
Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1207, 
1210–16 (1969). 
LCB_19_3_Art_11_Shaughnessy (Do Not Delete) 12/23/2015  12:56 PM 
2015] THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RABBIT HOLE 819 
lines, sometimes in defiance of an existing custody decree, in the hope of 
receiving a more favorable ruling in a new state.60 The ability of a state 
court to base custody jurisdiction on the in-state presence of the child, 
combined with the traditional understanding that a custody decree was 
subject to modification in the rendering court and in any other court 
with jurisdiction, encouraged parental defiance of custody decrees.61 It 
also risked frequent changes of child custody, which had come to be seen 
as damaging to the children involved.62 
In 1968, following lengthy study,63 the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Child Cus-
tody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA).64 The Act was intended to centralize most 
decisions related to custody in a single court that had access to relevant 
evidence about the child and the family and to insure that the custody 
court’s decisions were recognized and enforced in other states.65 
Like the UCCJEA, the UCCJA provided for jurisdiction in the child’s 
home state, or in the state where the child and at least one parental fig-
ure has a substantial connection.66 Unlike the UCCJEA, the earlier Act 
did not give priority to the home state forum.67 Both Acts also contained 
provisions for emergency jurisdiction based on the presence of the child, 
although they differed in the scope of that jurisdiction and both con-
tained an inconvenient forum provision.68 The UCCJA, like the UCCJEA, 
provided for jurisdiction without the need for in personam jurisdiction 
over the parties.69 Like the UCCJEA, the UCCJA was adopted by states 
across the country.70 
The concerns which led to the drafting of the UCCJA also led to 
congressional action. In 1980, Congress adopted the Parental Kidnap-
 
60 Id. at 1215–17; see Ratner, supra note 20, at 384.  
61 See, e.g., New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947) (allowing 
modification of Florida custody decree by a New York court after child was removed 
to New York by father). 
62 Bodenheimer, supra note 59, at 1208–09. 
63 For a description of the process leading to the enactment of the UCCJA, see 
Bodenheimer, supra note 59, at 1216–18 and Anne B. Goldstein, The Tragedy of the 
Interstate Child: A Critical Reexamination of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and 
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 845, 847–51 (1992).  
64 Bodenheimer, supra note 59, at 1207 n.1. 
65 Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction Act § 1, 9(1A) U.L.A. 271 (1999). 
66 Id. § 3(a)(1)–(2). 
67 Id. § 3. 
68 Id. § 3(a)(3)–(4). 
69 Id. § 12. It should be noted that the UCCJEA provision for jurisdiction to make 
child custody determinations, UCCJEA § 201, is described in the comment to the 
section as providing for subject matter jurisdiction and that the Act provides that 
personal jurisdiction over a party is not necessary. UCCJEA § 201(c). This 
declaration, in and of itself, surely does not resolve the question of the UCCJEA’s 
constitutionality under current Supreme Court doctrine. 
70 See Goldstein, supra note 63, at 849. 
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ping Prevention Act71 (hereinafter PKPA), which was intended, among 
other things, to require courts in most circumstances, to recognize and 
enforce one another’s custody decrees.72 PKPA was intended to comple-
ment the provisions of the UCCJA, and accordingly it conditioned the 
requirement of recognition and enforcement on the custody decree hav-
ing come from a court that had jurisdiction based upon the home state 
of the child, or failing that, the other jurisdictional provisions recognized 
in the UCCJA.73 
Although PKPA was intended to complement the UCCJA, there were 
some differences between the two schemes.74 Experience had also re-
vealed some problems with interpretation and implementation of the 
UCCJA.75 A desire to correct the problems led to the adoption of the 
UCCJEA.76 
Regardless of the changes which have occurred over the past several 
decades, one theme has remained constant: Congress, state legislatures, 
most state courts, and many scholars believe that courts can render cus-
tody decrees, including decrees terminating parental rights, based upon 
the connection of the child, not the defendant parent, with the forum 
state. Various explanations have been offered to justify this conclusion. 
One argument sometimes advanced was that the presence of the de-
fendant’s child in the forum state was itself a contact within the meaning 
of International Shoe, which would justify jurisdiction over the defendant 
in disputes involving the relationship between the child and the defend-
ant parent.77 In Kulko v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court rejected that 
argument.78 It held that California could not constitutionally exercise ju-
risdiction over an out-of-state father in a child support action.79 The 
Court held that any benefits the child received from California were not 
attributable to her father, and that simply agreeing to the child’s resi-
 
71 Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611 §§ 6–10, 94 
Stat. 3568 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.). 
72 See id. § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3569–71 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A). 
73 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (2012). 
74 Patricia M. Hoff, The ABC’s of the UCCJEA: Interstate Child-Custody Practice Under 
the New Act, 32 Fam. L.Q. 267, 269–73 (1998). 
75 Id. 
76 Id.; Kelly Gaines Stoner, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction & Enforcement Act 
(UCCJEA)—A Metamorphosis of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), 75 
N.D. L. Rev. 301, 301–02 (1999). 
77 See, e.g., Ann Bradford Stevens, Is Failure to Support a Minor Child in the State 
Sufficient Contact with that State to Justify In Personam Jurisdiction?, 17 S. Ill. U. L.J. 491 
(1993). 
78 Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93–94 (1978). 
79 Id. As a result of Kulko and the UCCJEA provisions, there are times when a 
parent seeking child custody and child support will have to bring suit in two different 
jurisdictions. In Kulko itself the plaintiff had sought both custody and support. The 
defendant did not contest the California court’s jurisdiction to determine custody. 
Kulko, 436 U.S. at 88. 
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dence in California was not sufficient to establish minimum contacts.80 It 
seems quite clear after Kulko that the jurisdiction courts exercise in cus-
tody and termination cases must be justified on some theory other than 
the traditional minimum contacts approach first formulated in Interna-
tional Shoe and most recently employed by the Court in Walden.81 
It is often contended that custody decisions are status determina-
tions.82 Support can be found in Supreme Court case law for this proposi-
tion. Pennoyer itself, as mentioned above, alluded in dicta to a state’s pow-
er to determine the status of its citizens, giving as an example actions for 
divorce.83 In Williams v. North Carolina,84 the Court, relying on the status 
exception, held that Nevada had jurisdiction to enter a divorce on behalf 
of a Nevada domiciliary, in the absence of any connection between the 
defendant and the forum.85 
Three years later, the Court decided International Shoe, ushering in 
the modern era of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. Since that time, it 
has not directly addressed the status exception. In Shaffer v. Heitner, the 
Court, in the course of rejecting the proposition that the presence of a 
defendant’s property in the state was sufficient to permit jurisdiction, 
opined that “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated 
according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its proge-
ny.”86 Taken at face value, this claim would suggest that the status excep-
tion was no longer constitutionally viable. However, with little explana-
tion, the Shaffer Court stated in a footnote that “We do not suggest that 
jurisdictional doctrines other than those discussed in text, such as the 
particularized rules governing adjudications of status, are inconsistent 
with the standard of fairness.”87 
 
80 Id. at 94–95. 
81 But see Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.Y.J.P., 823 A.2d 817, 837 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2003) (finding absent parent had minimum contacts when she 
requested that N.J. child welfare agency not return the child to her in Haiti, but keep 
the child in its custody in New Jersey). 
82 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 79 (1971); 
Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws §§ 54, 57 (1934); Brigitte M. 
Bodenheimer & Janet Neeley-Kvarme, Jurisdiction over Child Custody and Adoption After 
Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 229, 239–241 (1979). 
83 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734–735 (1898).  
84 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297–302 (1942). (“Each state as a 
sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern in the marital status of persons 
domiciled within its borders.”). In the course of its discussion, the Court rejected the 
proposition that divorce proceedings were proceedings in rem. 
85 The Court later held that Williams did not permit a court to exercise 
jurisdiction to enter judgments concerning property division or alimony based on 
plaintiff’s status. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418–19 (1957); Kreiger v. 
Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555, 556–57 (1948); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 548–49 (1948). 
These holdings led to the phenomenon of the divisible divorce. 
86 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977). 
87 Id. at 208 n.30 (citing Roger Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Tex. 
L. Rev. 657, 660–61 (1959)). 
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In spite of the Shaffer footnote, there is some doubt that the status 
exception justifies the jurisdictional provisions of the UCCJA and the 
UCCJEA.88 First, because the Court has never been entirely clear about 
the rationale for its insistence that jurisdiction requires the defendant’s 
“own affiliation with the State,” it is not clear how the status exception 
might be reconciled with the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurispru-
dence.89 It seems in some respects to hale back to the sovereignty ra-
tionale rejected in Compagnie des Bauxites and other recent cases.90 
Second, there is some disagreement about whether the status excep-
tion can and should be extended beyond the divorce context to determi-
nations of child custody and terminations of parental rights.91 They in-
volve very different considerations and the absent defendant arguably has 
more at stake in cases involving his relationship with his child than he 
does in cases involving his relationship with an estranged spouse.92 
Another difficulty with relying on the status exception is the Su-
preme Court’s puzzling opinion in May v. Anderson.93 May involved a situ-
ation where a husband and wife had separated. The couple and their 
three children had been domiciled in Wisconsin, but the wife and the 
children left for Ohio following the separation. The husband remained 
in Wisconsin and there obtained a decree granting him a divorce and 
custody of the children.94 Sometime later, after the children overstayed a 
visit with their mother in Ohio, the father sought a writ of habeas corpus 
from the Ohio court ordering their return. The Ohio court, believing 
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U. S. Constitution required it 
to give effect to the Wisconsin decree, ruled for the father.95 The Su-
preme Court reversed in an opinion by Justice Burton, holding that, 
without having in personam jurisdiction over the mother, Wisconsin could 
not cut off her “immediate right to the care, custody, management and 
 
88 It should also be noted that the provisions of the Uniform Acts, while they rely 
on the forum state’s connection to the child as a basis for jurisdiction, differ from the 
traditional status exception, found in the First Restatement, which referred to the 
child’s domicile. See Barbara Atwood, Child Custody Jurisdiction and Territoriality, 52 
Ohio St. L.J. 369, 376–84 (1991). 
89 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014).  
90 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
91 Atwood, supra note 88, at 376–84 (rejecting the status-exception rationale for 
the UCCJA in favor of a reliance on “territorial jurisdiction” premised on child-
centered contacts with the forum); Russell M. Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: 
Jurisdiction, Recognition, and Enforcement, 66 Minn. L. Rev. 711, 742–43 (1982); Rhonda 
Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and Personal Jurisdiction, 1995 U. Ill. L. Rev. 813, 816–19 
& n.15 (1995) (reviewing the scholarship on both sides of this debate). 
92 Coombs, supra note 91, at 745–51. 
93 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953). 
94 The Court stated that the lower court “gave weight” to the father’s contention 
that the children were domiciled in Wisconsin at the time of the decree, but found it 
unnecessary to determine that question. Id. at 534. The Court further noted that the 
mother’s domicile was stipulated to be Ohio at the time of the decree. Id. at 534 n.7. 
95 Id. at 529. 
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companionship of her minor children.”96 Justice Burton’s opinion in May 
cast doubt on the traditional approach to custody jurisdiction based up-
on the child’s domicile and was the subject of serious criticism.97 It 
seemed to suggest that the entry of the custody decree by the Wisconsin 
court violated May’s due process rights.98 Justice Frankfurter, in his con-
currence, wrote separately to urge that the Court held only that Ohio was 
not required under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to give effect to the 
Wisconsin decree, but that it would not offend the Due Process Clause if 
it chose to do so.99 
Although the status exception provides some support for the current 
jurisdictional regime, the regime can be justified on other grounds, 
which taken together should lead the Court to recognize that under cer-
tain circumstances, the need for a defendant’s own, voluntary affiliation 
with the forum can properly be dispensed with.100 
First, to the extent that the foundation of the Court’s restrictions on 
state court jurisdiction is procedural due process, the Act contains a 
number of protections for out-of-state defendants and in many jurisdic-
tions, additional procedural protections are furnished in certain catego-
ries of cases, such as terminations. The Act provides for notice to the de-
fendant parent and an opportunity to be heard.101 It also contains mech-
mechanisms that facilitate the long-distance participation of an absent 
parent.102 It provides mechanisms for the testimony of out-of-state parties 
and other witnesses to be taken in their home state, either by deposition 
or through an evidentiary hearing.103 Finally, the Act contains a provision 
permitting forum non conveniens dismissal when a court determines that 
a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.104 
 
96 Id. at 533. 
97 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., May v. Anderson: Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45 
Va. L. Rev. 379 (1959). As his title suggests, Hazard didn’t pull any punches in his 
critique. His conclusion begins, “May v. Anderson was decided on grounds 
unnecessary under the facts presented, untenable in the precedents decided, and 
uncomprehending of the consequences possibly to follow.” Id. at 406. See also Ratner, 
supra note 20, at 382–85. 
98 May, 345 U.S. at 537 (Jackson, J. dissenting). 
99 May, 345 U.S. at 535–36 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The drafters of the 
Uniform Acts concluded that Frankfurter’s opinion was the controlling opinion in 
May because his vote was necessary to the majority. See Bodenheimer, supra note 59, 
at 1232. For a criticism of this view, see Atwood, supra note 88, at 386. 
100 I don’t mean to suggest that the UCCJEA regime is immune from 
constitutional challenge. There may be circumstances where the exercise of 
jurisdiction under the Act should be struck down. See infra notes 124–125 and 
accompanying text. I am arguing that the UCCJEA’s general jurisdictional approach 
should be upheld. 
101 UCCJEA, supra note 13, § 106.  
102 Id. § 111–12.  
103 Id. 
104 Id. § 207. See Ratner, supra note 20, at 385–90 (arguing that the UCCJA 
satisfied procedural due process by implementing “effective-litigation values”).  
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In some cases additional procedural protections may be available to 
the parties. For example, parents may be entitled to appointed counsel in 
abuse and neglect proceedings and in termination-of-parental-rights pro-
ceedings.105 Questions have been raised about the adequacy of the repre-
sentation provided in some jurisdictions,106 and representation of absent 
defendants is likely to be particularly challenging. Nevertheless, in these 
cases the states are providing a safeguard that the Supreme Court has 
held not to be constitutionally required—a safeguard that has the poten-
tial to significantly reduce the burden on the most vulnerable out-of-state 
defendants.107 In cases involving children who are citizens of foreign 
countries, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provides for 
consular notification of the proceeding.108 Once notified, the consulate 
can provide substantial assistance, for example in helping to locate the 
absent parent, in gathering, translating and transmitting evidence from 
abroad, and in helping caseworkers coordinate with their counterparts 
overseas.109 
Next, the UCCJEA responds to the Court’s concern that “the States, 
through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on 
them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”110 By its 
terms, it provides for cooperation111 and communication112 between 
courts in different fora which have a potential interest in the matter. 
Moreover, the statute is an expression of the enacting state’s particular-
ized interest in exercising jurisdiction in these cases and the Court has 
from time to time suggested that such targeted expressions of interest are 
entitled to weight in the assessment of constitutionality.113 Even more sig-
nificant to the territoriality analysis, the adoption of the UCCJEA in forty-
nine states represents a consensus expression of the states’ understand-
ing of their shared responsibility for fairly adjudicating the custody of the 
“interstate child.”114 It is difficult to see how the exercise of jurisdiction 
 
105 Astra Outley, Representation for Children and Parents in Dependency 
Proceedings 7 (Pew Charitable Trs. 2004), http://www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rcw/ 
jurisdictions/am_n/usa/united_states/us_pew_report.pdf. 
106 Id. at 7–9. 
107 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24, 26–27 (1981). 
108 Multilateral Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol 
on Disputes art. 37(b), Apr. 24, 1964, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. 
109 See Ann Laquer Estin, Global Child Welfare: The Challenges for Family Law, 63 
Okla. L. Rev. 691, 701 (2011); Robert G. Spector, The Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations: The Most Neglected Provision of International Family Law, 22 Transnat’l L. & 
Contemp. Probs. 643, 650 (2013). 
110 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
111 UCCJEA, supra note 13, §§ 111, 112, 306. 
112 Id. §§ 204, 206, 207, 307. 
113 Kulko v. Superior. Court., 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 
186, 216 (1977); Carol S. Bruch, Statutory Reform of Constitutional Doctrine, 28 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 1047, 1052–53 (1995). 
114 This term is Albert Ehrenzweig’s. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Interstate Child 
and Uniform Legislation: A Plea for Extralitigious Proceedings, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1965). 
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under the UCCJEA by the courts of one state could be seen to infringe 
on the sovereignty of a sister state when that state had agreed to the “in-
fringement” in adopting the legislation that deprived its courts of juris-
diction. 
It is also worth noting that the jurisdictional approach of the 
UCCJEA is mirrored in the federal legislation, the PKPA, governing the 
circumstances under which custody decrees are entitled to full faith and 
credit.115 That statute shares the UCCJEA’s focus on concentrating child-
custody jurisdiction in the child’s “home state,” whether or not the de-
fendant parent has significant connections with the state.116 Congress, of 
course, enjoys constitutional authority to legislate with respect to the ef-
fect of state court judgments, and hence its action should be entitled to 
some weight in the consideration of whether the exercise of UCCJEA ju-
risdiction is constitutional. 
The Court has also expressed comity concerns, from time to time, in 
cases involving jurisdiction over foreign nationals.117 The UCCJEA takes 
into account these concerns. It provides for enforcement of foreign de-
crees made under circumstances in conformity with the standards of the 
Act and it requires that courts defer to the jurisdiction of foreign states 
with closer ties to the child, just as they must defer to courts of sister 
states.118 
The third justification for the Court’s restrictions is the substantive 
due process justification. On this understanding, the defendant’s right to 
be free from the jurisdiction of a state with which he has not voluntarily 
affiliated is a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Although the cases are not very clear, they can be read to suggest that 
this liberty interest may be separate and apart from any liberty or proper-
ty interest that the defendant has in the object of the litigation.119 If this is 
indeed a proper understanding, the question then becomes what level of 
justification, if any, can overcome the defendant’s interest. If the right is 
 
115 Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611 § 8(a), 94 
Stat. 3569–71 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A).  
116 Id. 
117 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762–63 (2014); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. 
v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115–16 (187). 
118 UCCJEA, supra note 13, § 105. See D. Marianne Blair, International Application 
of the UCCJEA: Scrutinizing the Escape Clause, 38 Fam. L.Q. 547, 547 (2004). The Act also 
attempts to harmonize state law in this area with the United States’ obligations under 
various international instruments, including the Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
Child Abduction. Id. at 548. The Convention has been controversial and the rich 
literature of that controversy is beyond the scope of this paper. It is fair to observe, 
however, that the Court might not be in the best position to dictate what comity 
demands in the area of international child custody determinations.  
119 The parent’s interest in the object of the litigation—his or her relationship 
with her child—is a fundamental right, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–59 
(1982), but the parent’s interest in avoiding the jurisdiction of a particular state’s 
courts may not be. See infra notes 120–121 and accompanying text.  
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fundamental, strict scrutiny would normally apply.120 If not, a rational ba-
sis for state intrusion should be adequate justification.121 
In the context of child-abuse and neglect cases and termination-of-
parental-rights cases, the need for courts with jurisdiction over the child 
to be able to proceed, even when a parent is absent from the state, is 
compelling. In many circumstances, the cases involve children in the cus-
tody of child welfare agencies. Whether the children have been allowed 
to remain at home or removed to foster care, the agency, with court over-
sight, will spend months or more working to permit the return of the 
children to the parent’s custody or, failing that, to bring the case to com-
pletion through a termination proceeding.122 The need for ongoing court 
oversight and the involvement of public agencies as parties to the pro-
ceeding make the possibility of litigating these cases in more than one 
jurisdiction practically impossible. Of course, if traditional minimum 
contacts were required, a court overseeing a case involving an in-state 
parent and an out-of-state parent could exercise jurisdiction to terminate 
the rights of the in-state parent but decline to act as to the absent parent. 
In that case, however, the child would be left in limbo, with no legal rela-
tionship with the parent who was likely most involved with the child be-
fore the termination but without the ability to be adopted because of the 
court’s inability to terminate the rights of the absent parent. The need to 
avoid that outcome is surely a compelling state interest. Several state 
courts have addressed the constitutionality of the exercise of jurisdiction 
to terminate the parental rights of an absent parent and for the most part 
they have concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction was permissible.123 
 
120 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 792–
94 (3d ed. 2006). 
121 Id. John Parry points out that “the Court has never indicated that personal 
jurisdiction implicates a fundamental right,” and suggests that rational basis is the 
correct standard to apply to the substantive due process analysis in personal 
jurisdiction cases. Parry, supra note 8, at 853. Parry, it should be noted, believes that 
procedural due process and federalism also play a role in the Court’s decisions 
limiting the jurisdiction of state courts. Id. at 853 n.123. 
122 For a brief overview of the process, see Child Welfare Info. Gateway, 
Understanding Child Welfare and the Courts (2011), https://www. 
childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/cwandcourts.pdf.  
123 See, e.g., J.D. v. Tuscaloosa Dep’t of Human Res., 923 So.2d 303, 308 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 2005); In re Appeal in Maricopa Cty. Juvenile Action No. JS-734, 543 P.2d 454, 
460 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); In re Interest of M.L.K., 768 P.2d 316, 319 (Kan. App. 
1989); Wenz v. Schwartze, 598 P.2d 1086, 1092 (Mont. 1979); Div. of Youth and 
Family Servs. v. M.Y.J.P., 823 A.2d 817, 836–38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) 
(requiring minimum contacts in termination but finding them in mother’s 
acquiescence to N.J. child welfare agency’s custody of child); Graham v. Copeland (In 
re Adoption of Copeland), 43 S.W.3d 483, 487 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); In re M.S.B. 611 
S.W.2d 704, 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); State ex rel. W.A. v. State, 63 P.3d 607, 611 
(Utah 2002); In re R.W., 39 A.3d 682, 700 (Vt. 2011); In re Thomas J.R., 663 N.W.2d 
734, 736 (Wis. 2003). But see In re Doe, 926 P.2d 1290, 1292, 1295 (Haw. 1996); In re 
Vernon R.V., 991 P.2d 986, 986 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999). 
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I don’t mean to suggest that the UCCJEA jurisdictional regime re-
solves all due process and sovereignty concerns successfully, as written or 
as applied. Arguments could be made that the procedural protections af-
forded absent parents are not sufficient and that additional efforts 
should be required to allow full participation by those defendants.124 It 
might also be argued that, at least in cases pitting two parents against 
each other, more consideration should be given to dismissing in favor of 
the courts of the residence of the defendant parent, in cases where the 
child’s interest can be protected and evidence made available in that fo-
rum.125 Similarly, although the UCCJEA does take into account the inter-
est of foreign states and of foreign parents, it may be that, as the interna-
tional law of custody evolves, Congress, the drafters of the UCCJEA, and 
the state legislatures will need to reexamine how United States jurisdic-
tion law can best be harmonized with international law.126 However, even 
in light of these concerns, on balance the UCCJEA regime has been suc-
cessful and should be permitted to continue, with adjustments as needed. 
The UCCJEA, particularly in its application to termination of paren-
tal rights cases, provides a counter-example to prevailing jurisdictional 
doctrine. It represents a vigorous assertion of the interests of the states in 
a jurisdictional regime that provides for exclusive jurisdiction over all 
parties in a termination case in a single jurisdiction. The basis for juris-
diction is the connection of the forum with the child whose interests are 
the central concern of the litigation, not the connection of the defendant 
with the forum. The justification for the jurisdictional regime is found in 
the forum’s compelling need to protect children subject to its jurisdic-
tion and to the degree possible to provide them with a stable and perma-
nent home. The UCCJEA represents an example of a constitutional re-
gime of jurisdiction that once seemed to be within reach—a regime 
focused on the interest of the state in resolving the dispute and the con-
nection of the litigation to the forum.127 As some of the other contribu-
 
124 See, e.g., In re R.W., 39 A.3d at 700–04 (Dooley, J., concurring) (discussing the 
trial court’s failure to protect the absent father’s right to participate and suggesting 
additional protections that should be afforded on remand). 
125 See Wasserman, supra note 91, at 867–92, 891.  
126 See Estin, supra note 109, at 715–22 and Robert G. Spector, Memorandum: 
Accommodating the UCCJEA and the 1996 Hague Convention, 63 Okla. L. Rev. 615 (2011) 
for a discussion of recent efforts to coordinate with the Hague Child Protection 
Convention. As the UCCJA, the UCCJEA, and related international conventions have 
evolved over time, concerns about their impact on domestic violence victims and 
their children have been expressed and to some extent addressed, although concerns 
remain that the issues have not been fully resolved. See, e.g., Carol S. Bruch, The Unmet 
Needs of Domestic Violence Victims and Their Children in Hague Child Abduction Convention 
Cases, 38 Fam. L.Q. 529 (2004); Joan Zorza, The UCCJEA: What Is It and How Does It 
Affect Battered Women in Child-Custody Disputes, 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 909 (2000). 
127 See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
241, 281–82; Traynor, supra note 87, at 660–61; Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. 
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tors to this symposium have persuasively argued, it may be time for the 
Court to reconsider the desirability of that regime.128 
 
 
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1126 
(1966).  
128 See, e.g., Stanley E. Cox, Personal Jurisdiction for Alleged Intentional or Negligent 
Effects, Matched to Forum Regulatory Interest, 19 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 725 (2015) and 
John T. Parry, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction After Bauman and Walden, 19 Lewis & 
Clark L. Rev. 607 (2015) (both arguing that a forum’s regulatory interest should 
presumptively support jurisdiction); Cassandra Burke Robertson and Charles W. 
“Rocky” Rhodes, A Shifting Equilibrium: Personal Jurisdiction, Transnational Litigation, 
and the Problem of Nonparties, 19 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 643, 671(2015) (discussing the 
need for input from the political branches in formulating court access doctrine). 
